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Abstract: 
In their paper 'A prosentential theory of truth'
1
 Grover, Camp and Belnap propound a theory of truth which is 
essentially a modified version of Ramsey's redundancy theory of truth. In this paper I shall not seek to deter-
mine whether or not the prosentential theory is true; rather I shall attempt to show that its proponents' argument 
for its plausibility breaks down at certain crucial points, most notably when they discuss the matter of 
propositional quantification. In the first section of this paper I shall give a brief account of the prosentential 
theory of truth as expounded by Grover, Camp and Belnap; in the second section I shall lodge three main 
complaints against the theory so expounded. 
 
Article: 
The account of the prosentential theory of truth that I shall give in this section will be confined to an exposition 
of those aspects of the theory which must bear the brunt of the criticism to be given in the second section. 
Grover, Camp and Belnap (henceforth to be referred to simply as 'the authors') start by giving a brief 
reconstruction of Ramsey's redundancy theory. They are careful to point out that what they present is a 
reconstruction of this theory, since Ramsey's own remarks concerning the theory are cryptic and require 
interpretation and elaboration. The main thesis of the redundancy theory is that we can say in English without 
the help of a truth-predicate anything we can say with it, and that therefore there is no reason to assume that 
truth is a property which attaches to certain entities (usually considered to be either propositions, statements or 
sentences) which might be called the 'bearers' of truth. The authors distinguish five main ways in which the 
predicate 'is true' may be seen to be dispensable. I shall mention only three of these ways. The first way is 
exemplified in the following case of 'disappearing'. The sentence 
 
The authors then go on to discuss six objections to the redundancy theory thus reconstructed. I shall mention 
just three of these. The first of these objections is, according to the authors, one to which the redundancy theory 
succumbs but one which does not apply to the prosentential theory. If we consider (2) and (2a) again, it may be 
argued that (2a) is not equivalent to (2) in that in (2) Mary's remark acknowledges that there is an antecedent 
(i.e., John's remark) whereas in (2a) no such acknowledgement is made. In (2), by using 'That is true', Mary 
avoids the charge of plagiarism; but in (2a) she is open to this charge. Thus, in this instance, the Ramsey 
translation fails pragmatically. 
 
The second and third objections concern propositional quantification. First (the second objection), one might 
argue that English proper does not make use of propositional quantification in the manner that Ramsey does, 
and thus that Ramsey's proof that the truth-predicate is redundant in English is faulty (i.e., he only proves his 
case, if at all, for an ad hoc extension of English which makes use of propositional quantification). The authors 
do not attempt to answer this objection, but postpone consideration of it until after they have discussed the 
prosentential theory. Second (the third objection), it has been objected (notably by Heidelberger 
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) that such 
propositional quantification as that expressed in (3a) and (4a) is ungrammatical when introduced into English 
proper, since English requires that variables have predicates attached to them. The authors deny this, although 
they concede that it is (at first) 'natural' to think that this objection is sound. Consider (3) and (3a) again. It may 
seem that a 'literal' reading of (3a) would be 
 
(3b) For each proposition, if John says that it, then it*, 
 
and obviously this cannot be a fair paraphrase of (3), since (3) is grammatical whereas (3b) is not. And so it 
seems that (3a) should be read 
 
(3c) For each proposition, if John says that it is true, then it is true*, 
 
which, when paraphrased back into the English-cum-special-notation of Ramsey, would read (more 
perspicuously) 
 
(3d)  (J ohn says that Tp  Tp)*. 
 
Although the authors agree that (3b) is ungrammatical and further agree, as will be seen, that (3c) is the proper 
reading of (3a), they think that the analysis of (3c) by means of (3d) is 'essentially wrongheaded'. They claim 
that propositional quantification, where the propositional variables in sentences occupy sentential positions and 
not nominal positions, is perfectly respectable, not only formally, but semantically. They plan to show that this 
is true by means of a theory of 'prosentences', and it is this that lies at the heart of their theory of truth. 
 
The key to the understanding of prosentences is the linguistic relation of anaphora. The authors give no rigorous 
account of this relation, but they do cite examples of its use. Consider the sentence 
 
(5) Mary wanted to buy a car, but she could only afford a motorbike *. 
 
In this sentence, the pronoun 'she' is used anaphorically, in that it refers to an 'antecedent' (Mary). (Of course, 
pronouns can also be used non-anaphorically, but that is another matter.) The use of anaphora, such as that 
illustrated in 
 
(5), rules out ambiguities by means of the 'cross-reference' of anaphor to antecedent. 
 
It is often possible to substitute the antecedent for the anaphor and yet preserve the sense (barring ambiguity) 
and truth-value of the original. For instance, (5) could be paraphrased as 
 
(5 a) Mary wanted to buy a car, but Mary could only afford a motor-bike *, 
 
and, barring ambiguity, (5a) is equivalent to (5). But it is not always possible to make such substitution. 
Consider 
 
(6) John visited us. It was a surprise*. 
 
Here, 'It' cannot be substituted by its antecedent, for nonsense results. Nevertheless, 'It' may be substituted by an 
'anaphoric substituend' of an appropriate sort, such as 'John's visit' or 'John's visiting us'. With quantificational 
uses of anaphors any 'direct' substitution is completely ruled out, although such an anaphor does 'pick up' (as the 
authors put it) what may be called a 'family' of substituends. 
 
We should make special note of the fact that anaphors do not always occupy nominal positions. Other than 
anaphoric pronouns, there are anaphoric proverbs, anaphoric proadjectives, and anaphoric proadverbs. Such 
anaphors are all species of the genus 'proform'. The authors stipulate that a proform's species is determined 
according to the position it occupies in a sentence, and not according to its antecedent's grammatical status. 
Thus 'It' in (6) is a pronoun, not a prosentence, according to this way of viewing things. Are there any 
prosentences in English? That is, are there any anaphors which occupy sentential positions? The authors' answer 
is, of course, that there are, but that prosentences are perhaps not so conspicuous as, say, pronouns. 
 
Before considering particular prosentences in English proper, the authors propose to consider an artificial 
prosentence 'thatt' which might be included in an extension of English. They believe that this will promote 
understanding with regard to the function of prosentences. Suppose `thatt' is an atomic (one- word) prosentence 
that is generally available (i.e., it may be placed in arbitrary sentential positions). How could it be used in our 
extension of English? Two examples might be: 
 
(2b) John: Snow is white. Mary: Thatt*; 
(4b)For every proposition, either thatt or not thatt*.
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(4b) shows that 'thatt' can be used in quantificational contexts to express a generalization, without recourse to a 
truth-predicate. At this point it is worth recording what the authors say in this regard: 
 
[W ]e thereby solve the problem of reading Ramsey's propositional variables (without adding a truth predicate) 
not into English itself but at least into English + `thatt'.
5 
 
I shall return to this in the second section of this paper. 
 
Two important points regarding 'than' should be noted, according to the authors. First, when, for example, Mary 
says 'Thatt' in (2b), she is 'repeating' what John said, but is not plagiarizing him, for her utterance acknowledges 
the presence of an antecedent. Second, English + 'thatt' is only grammatically, and is not conceptually, different 
from English (or so the authors claim). 
 
At this stage the authors make their main point: 'that is true' and 'it is true' may be seen to function as molecular 
(i.e., more-than-one-word) prosentences in English, just as 'thatt' functions as an atomic prosentence in English 
+ 'thatt'. This contention is supported by checking the function of 'that is true' and 'it is true' with that of 
prosentences in general. First, prosentences occupy sentential position; so do 'that is true' and 'it is true'. Second, 
prosentences are used anaphorically. The authors claim that 'that is true' in (2), for instance, may be seen quite 
reasonably to function thus. So too with 'it is true' in other contexts. This must also apply, of course, to 
quantificational cases. That it does so may be seen in the case of (3c). Third, prosentences are generic or fully 
general; that is, they 'take on' whatever sense their antecendent has. This is obviously so with 'that is true' and 'it 
is true'. Fourth, the notions of antecedent and anaphoric substituend are appropriate to prosentences. This is true 
also of 'that is true' and 'it is true' when used anaphorically. 
 
But it is not sufficient for the authors' purpose to show that 'that is true' and 'it is true' may function as 
prosentences. The authors must show that these expressions always do function as prosentences; not only that, 
they must show that all uses of 'is true' and derivatives in English are analyzable in terms of 'that is true' and `it 
is true'. To show this, the authors carve out a sublanguage English * from English proper. The difference 
between English and English* is that English* does not contain the truth-predicate in any 'interesting' sense, but 
does contain the prosentences 'that is true' and 'it is true' together with such connectives (drawn from English 
proper) as 'itis-true-that', 'it-is-false-that', 'it-might-be-true-that', etc. (put in hyphenated form to stress that the 
truth-predicate is not 'separable' when thus used). 
 
The authors then seek to show that whatever can be said in English can be said (perhaps with a little syntactic 
tinkering) in English*. 
 
The authors probably cannot prove their case concerning the relation between English and English*, for this 
might well require a consideration of an infinite number of particular uses of the predicate 'is true' in English. 
But they are content to render it plausible by considering typical instances of 'disappearing', 'quantification', and 
so on. Consider the English sentence 
 
(7) It is true that snow is white, but it rarely looks white in Pittsburgh*. 
 
This may be rendered in English* as 
 
(7a)Snow is white . That is true, but it rarely looks white in Pittsburgh*. 
 
Or consider 
 
(8) Everything John says is true *; 
 
this (as stated above) may be rendered 
 
(3c)For each proposition, if John says that it is true, then it is true*. 
 
Or consider, as a final example, a 'modified' case such as 
 
(8) That might be true*; 
 
this may be rendered (making use of the required connective) as 
 
(8a) It-might-be-true-that that is true*. 
 
Informally, then, the authors claim to have demonstrated their case: as in English*, in English the truth-
predicate does not play a property-ascribing role. 
 
One source of puzzlement is, of course, the connectives in English*, for some of these contain the term 'true' 
and yet they are not prosentences. Can we be sure that the function of this term in such connectives really is 'un-
interesting' and does not conceal a property-ascribing role? The authors think that we can be sure of this. For 
such connectives were introduced merely to show up the 'deep structure' of English*. Often they could be 
omitted simply in favor of retaining some of the modified prosentences of English, such as 'that might be true', 
'it was true', etc.. The authors admit that where the argument of the connective is a proper sentence in its own 
right, the connective is not totally redundant, since it carries some 'pragmatic punch' by way of anaphoric 
overtones. But they claim that it is semantically redundant, such that 'true' still plays no property-ascribing role. 
Finally, the authors do admit that there are even some semantically irredundant uses of such connectives, as in 
some cases of the forming of contradictories. They offer no solution to this problem (although they try to 
wriggle out of it by means of a puzzling parable 6); but they presumably do not feel that this one (present) 
difficulty should force them to abandon what appears to be a promising theory. 
 
The authors then turn to some objections to the prosentential theory of truth (only the most pertinent of which I 
shall discuss). They consider first the objections that were originally made against Ramsey's redundancy theory. 
First, the problem with pragmatics that the redundancy theory faced is overcome by the prosentential theory: for 
a prosentence, being anaphoric, acknowledges the presence of an antecedent. Second: whereas Ramsey tries to 
show that 'true' is totally redundant, the authors have of course not tried to show this, but have only tried to 
show that a 'separable' truth-predicate is redundant in English. Furthermore, since English * is a fragment of 
English, it cannot be argued that the authors have made use of an ad hoc extension of English to prove their 
case. Third: again, since English* is a fragment of English, the charge that the use of propositional 
quantification is ungrammatical in English is vitiated, since it is grammatical in English*. 
 
The authors also consider the following objection. Assuming that one reason for undertaking to demonstrate the 
plausibility of the prosentential theory of truth is to undermine the plausibility of the contention that there exist 
propositions in the universe, it might be argued that in all the foregoing the authors have suffered from 'tunnel 
vision'. Consider, for instance, the statement 
 
(9) That is surprising, but it is true*. 
 
Even if one argues that 'it is true' here is a prosentence, this cannot be claimed for 'That is surprising'; and since 
'That' obviously refers to some entity to which, it is plausible to contend, 'it' would also seem to refer, why 
bother with the prosentential theory at all? The authors' response — one that I find difficult to evaluate — is 
that 'That' and 'it' in (9) do not refer to the same entities, even if 'it' is taken to refer. If 'it' is taken to refer it is 
presumably taken to refer to a proposition. But 'That' in 'That is surprising' refers to a fact or event or state of 
affairs. The authors believe that a proposition, were it to exist, would be a different sort of entity from a fact or 
event or state of affairs. Perhaps this is so; I do not know. At any rate, I shall not seek to support or refute their 
contention. 
 
The authors do recognize, however, that the existence of propositions is not only asserted for the sake of 
pinning the title `(prime) bearers of truth' on to certain entities. A second main reason for the assertion of their 
existence is that the phenomenon of belief and other psychological attitudes appears to necessitate their 
existence. The prosentential theory of truth of course has nothing to say in this respect. But the authors have. 
They suggest (it is no more than a suggestion) that, for example, 'You believe it' could itself be analyzed as a 
prosentence prefixed by a non-truth-functional connective, i.e., as 'You-believe-that it is true'. If this is true, 
then the second main motivation for asserting the existence of propositions is undermined. 
 
The authors also recognize that 'that' in 'that is true' (and 'it' in 'it is true') could quite plausibly be analyzed as an 
anaphoric pronoun. Thus the prosentential theory is not unique in being able to explain the anaphora that 
undoubtedly accompanies such statements as 'That is true'. In fact, the authors agree that they have not shown 
the prosentential theory of truth to be true, but merely to be consistent and plausible. But why, then, prefer it to 
a more conventional theory of truth (if there is such a thing) where 'that' in 'that is true' is taken to function 
pronominally? The authors claim that there are several advantages to their theory, that it affords considerable 
'philosophical payoff'.' But, so far as I can judge, the only real advantage to constructing a theory where 'true' 's 
role in English is taken to be, not wholly redundant, but logical rather than ascriptive is this: it undermines one 
of the arguments for the existence of propositions, namely that truth must be borne by some ontological entity. 
(There are, of course, arguments against the contention that entities other than propositions, such as sentences, 
are the prime bearers of truth.) Some philosophers may, of course, have no qualms about asserting the existence 
of propositions and thus fail to recognize this consequence of the theory as an advantage. But others may 
recognize it to be an advantage. I shall not discuss this issue. Rather, I shall now address myself to the question: 
Have the authors shown the prosentential theory of truth to be plausible? I shall argue that they have not shown 
this. 
 
II 
In this section I shall not consider the question whether or not the authors have told the truth concerning the 
function of 'that is true' and 'it is true' in English. On the contrary, I shall leave this question entirely to one side 
and content myself with asking: Have the authors shown us any reason to believe that the prosentential theory 
of truth is true? 
 
The account of the prosentential theory given in the first section of this paper leaves a lot of questions 
unanswered. This is partly due to the selectiveness of the account, partly due to the fact that the authors' own 
exposition of the theory is incomplete in many respects (as they are themselves aware). But in this section I 
shall inquire into only three main points, all of which the authors claim to have adequately, if not exhaustively, 
treated. These are: the role of `thatt' in English + 'thatt'; the function of the connectives in English*; and the 
plausibility of contending that English sanctions propositional quantification. 
 
The authors introduce the atomic prosentence 'thatt' on a temporary basis only, but they do so in order to render 
the contention that 'that is true' and 'it is true' are prosentences more plausible. It is therefore necessary to deter-
mine just what the effect of the discussion of 'thatt' is in terms of bolstering the prosentential theory. My 
impression is that the introduction of 'thatt' is of no help at all. Certainly the grammar of 'thatt' seems to be 
perfectly straightforward (except in quantificational contexts — see below), and it is not implausible to assume 
that certain terms in English may function as prosentences, though perhaps not as generally available 
prosentences. (Indeed, the authors discuss certain uses of 'yes' and 'so' in this respect.) It is the authors' claim 
that English + 'thatt' is not conceptually different from English that I find puzzling. What evidence is there for 
this claim? The only way in which I can understand the use of 'thatt', as presented by the authors, is to interpret 
it as a paraphrase of 'that is true' or 'it is true'. But, then, I am not at all sure that 'thatt', when thus interpreted, 
does or can function as a prosentence. It seems to me a circular enterprise on the part of the authors that they 
should seek to argue from the contention that 'thatt' can function as a prosentence in English + 'thatt' to the 
contention that 'that is true' and `it is true' can function as prosentences in English. For, although 'thatt' seems 
syntactically innocuous as long as it remains uninterpreted, once it is interpreted it becomes a serious question 
whether or not it can function as a prosentence. Furthermore, since its obvious interpretation would seem to be 
in terms of 'that is true' or 'it is true', it would seem that the authors might just as well have argued from the 
contention that 'that is true' and 'it is true' can function as prosentences in English to the contention that 'thatt' 
can function as a prosentence in English + 'thatt' . But that, of course, would not have served their purpose. I 
argue that the manner in which they do in fact proceed also does not serve their purpose. 
 
The second point that I wish to discuss concerns the role of the connectives 'it-is-true-that', 'it-is-false-that', 'it-
might-be-true-that', etc., in English*. Right off the bat, I consider it a grave admission on the authors' part that 
they do not know how to handle certain cases of contradictories without a semantically irredundant use of 'true'. 
They state outright: 
 
[W ]e think... that there are cases falling under the rubric 'modified disappearing' in which there is no way to 
eliminate 'true' without semantic loss.' 
 
They admit that they believe that 
 
there are in English sentences for which one cannot find an unambiguous contradictory without using a 
connective made from a predicate, such as It is not true that'.
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But if this is true, surely their project has failed; for English* (and hence English) must then contain some 
'interesting' uses of 'true', i.e., uses of 'true' which are not just involved in the prosentences 'that is true' or 'it is 
true' or in a 'harmless' use of 'true' in certain connectives. 
 
But let us now turn to what I have just called the 'harmless' uses of 'true' in the connectives of English*, i.e., to 
those uses of 'true' which the authors allege are semantically redundant (even if perhaps not pragmatically so). 
What are we to make of the claim that, for instance, 'it-might-be-true-that that is true' could just as well be 
rendered 'it might be true' without doing violence to the prosentential theory? If the claim is correct, this entails 
that such expressions as It might be true', 'that is false', 'it will be true', and so on, function simply as (modified) 
prosentences in English. But this means that there are really very many generally available prosentences in 
English, not just 'that is true' and 'it is true'; and to the person who never even suspected that there were such 
things as prosentences in the first place, this proliferation of prosentences may prove a little hard to swallow. 
Now, I have no argument to show that such expressions as 'it might be true', etc., cannot or do not function as 
prosentences in English; I wish merely to point out that the authors, in asserting the semantic redundancy of the 
special connectives of Engish*, are committed to this view. Whereas one might be inclined to accept that 'that is 
true' and 'it is true' can function as prosentences, one might be less inclined to accept that such complex 
expressions as, say, 'perhaps it would have been true' can and do function as simple anaphors. But again I admit 
that this does not prove that they cannot or do not function thus. 
 
The third and final point I wish to discuss in connection with the pro- sentential theory is to my mind the most 
important. For it seems to me that at the heart of the theory is the contention that propositional quantification is 
a perfectly respectable grammatical device in English — one, moreover, of which use is often made. It is this 
contention that needs above all to be evaluated. Once again, I do not wish to claim that the contention is false, 
for I have no argument to prove this. But I do wish to maintain that the authors have done nothing to prove it 
true. 
 
Let us review the authors' arguments with respect to propositional quantification. We recall that Ramsey made 
use of propositional quantification in (3a) and (4a) above. (Carnap, incidentally, proposes a theory of truth 
similar to Ramsey's in this regard.) Heidelberger, among others, complained that statements such as (3a) and 
(4a) could not be rendered in English without the introduction of a truth-predicate (or some similar predicate), 
such that (3a) is best phrased, in semiformal notation, as (3d) and (4a) is best phrased as (4c).
10
 It is worth citing 
Heidelberger at this point: 
 
It must be acknowledged that a number of quite respectable logical systems contain propositional variables 
without there being any predicates attached to them. Thus, for example, (in] Lewis and Langford's Symbolic 
Logic ... there appears the formula: (3 p)(p). But the existence of such formulae by themselves has no bearing 
upon the issue under discussion. For it may be that when such formulae are interpreted a predicate will be 
supplied which is not written into the formula itself. Such, in fact, is the case with the formula mentioned above. 
In interpreting his formula Lewis adds the predicate 'true', reading it: 'There exists at least one proposition p 
which is true'.... There is of course nothing that requires the addition of 'true' rather than another predicate. But 
the point is that if we are to get an English sentence out of the formula we have to supply some predicate and 
that is what Ramsey and Carnap fail to do. Because their theory of truth precludes their adding any predicate 
whatever, they must leave us with formulae for which they have provided no sense.
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The complaint, then, concerns not whether or not a formal logical system can be set up which makes use of 
propositional quantification, for obviously such a system can be and has been set up. The complaint concerns, 
rather, whether or not such a system can be interpreted in English in such a manner so as not to force the 
introduction of a truth-predicate (or some similar predicate). Heidelberger claims that this cannot be done. The 
authors claim that this can be done, so long as it is recognized that English contains the prosentences `that is 
true' and 'it is true' (and their modifications). 
 
How do the authors attempt to prove their point? They do so in two stages: first, they try to show that 'thatt' may 
be properly quantified; from this they argue that 'that is true' and 'it is true' may be properly quantified. The 
whole issue in fact centers on the first stage: the contention that 'thatt' may be properly quantified. 
 
What arguments do the authors adduce to support their contention that 'thatt' may be quantified? None. They 
merely assert that 'thatt' is open to quantification.
12
 They seem to be content simply to give illustrations of its 
use in quantificational contexts, such as in (4b) above or in 
 
(3e) For every proposition, if John says that thatt, then thatt*. 
 
But although the authors are perfectly free to stipulate that 'thatt' can function in quantificational contexts so 
long as it remains uninterpreted, they are not free to do so without argument where 'thatt' is interpreted. And 
what is the proper interpretation of 'thatt? Again, it would seem that 'thatt' is best understood to mean 'that is 
true' or 'it is true'. So, again, the authors are running in a circle, and they are hardly in a position to claim (as 
recorded above) that they have 'solved the problem of reading Ramsey's propositional variables' even into 
English + 'thatt', if 'reading' is taken (as it seems it should be) to connote some measure of understanding on the 
part of the reader. 
 
But the authors do mention that 'thatt' and propositional quantification in general are treated in an earlier paper 
by Grover, and it is to this that I now turn.
13
 It is interesting to note that in this paper Grover admits that there 
are no faithful and perspicuous readings in English proper of such formulae as (3a) and (4a). But she claims that 
such sentences are easily paraphrased in an extension of English which is "sensible and philosophically 
innocuous". Grover takes special note of the problems that confront anyone who seeks to defend such a claim. 
Consider the sentence 
 
(10) r((John believes that r).- (Bill believes that r))*. 
 
This may indeed be read as 
 
(10a) If John believes something then Bill does too*,  
 
or as 
 
(10b) Bill believes everything that John believes*.  
 
But the point is, (10a) and (10b) do not follow the form of (10). Or again, 
 
(11) (r -+ snow is white)* 
 
may indeed be read as 
 
(1 la) There is something such that if it is true then snow is white*, or as 
(11b) Something implies that snow is white*. 
 
But (11a) introduces 'is true'; and in (11b) „‟ is no longer read as a connective but as a predicate, so that 
'Something' either becomes a name for a sentence or must probably be treated as a 'that'-clause. And Grover 
acknowledges: 
 
In suggesting readings in English of quantified formulas it is essential to find something that does the job in 
English that the variable does in the formal language.
14
 
 
This is exactly the point that needs to be stressed. 
 
Grover then turns to prosentences, claiming that these can and do function in English exactly as propositional 
variables function in such statements as (3a), (4a), (10) and (11). Unfortunately, at this point she introduces the 
artificial prosentence `thatt', rendering (10) as 
 
(10c)For each proposition, if John believes that thatt, then Bill believes 
that thatt*. 
 
I have already argued that unless 'thatt is interpreted in such a fashion that its analogue's function in English 
would clearly be seen to be that of a prosentence, this discussion of `thatt' serves no useful purpose. This 
criticism applies equally to the discussions of 'thatt in both papers, and I shall add nothing to it here, except to 
note that the extension of English to English + 'thatt is hardly 'philosophically innocuous'. 
 
Grover claims that the anaphoric role of prosentences in propositional quantification with propositional 
variables mirrors the anaphoric role of pronouns in what may be called 'individual' quantification with 
individual variables. For instance consider the sentence 
 
(12)  
 
This may be read as 
 
           (12a) There is some individual such that for each individual the first admires the second and the second knows 
the first*. 
 
In (12a), Grover claims, 'the first' and 'the second' are pronouns which function anaphorically. This is quite 
correct. But we should note here what I take to be a crucial difference between statements like (12) and 
statements like (10), a difference which Grover neglects to discuss. It is this. (12) could also be read as 
 
(12b) There is some individual x such that for each individual y, x admires y and y knows x. 
 
But no such parallel reading is possible for (10). In particular, (10) cannot be read as 
 
            (10d) For each proposition r, if John believes that r, then Bill believes that r, 
 
and this is so for the very reason that Heidelberger stresses: (10d) is ungrammatical (let alone the fact that it 
presupposes the existence of propositions, a presupposition that Grover obviously does not wish to make).
15 
 
But Grover, while agreeing that (10d) is ungrammatical, would insist that it is a mistaken reading of (10). It is 
(10c) (perhaps with 'thatt' replaced by 'it is true') that is correct, for only in (10c) is 'r' taken to be a bona fide 
propositional variable that occupies sentential position. But if this is the case, then certainly 'For each 
proposition' in (10c) cannot act as a universal quantifier in the normal sense, for it cannot range over anything, 
let alone propositions. Now Grover in her article and all three authors in theirs are quite willing to accept this 
consequence of propositional quantification. Indeed they stress this very point. But Grover maintains that, 
despite the grammatical and domain differences between propositional quantifiers on the one hand and 
individual quantifiers on the other, "propositional quantifiers do the job required of quantifiers" 
16
 in that they 
make general statements. 
 
We have finally got down to brass tacks. It is now admitted that the function of quantifiers in propositional 
quantification is significantly different from their function in individual quantification. We know that individual 
quantification may function properly in English; but what proof do we have that propositional quantification 
may so function? The authors insist that propositional quantification may so function, basing their contention on 
examples of the use of the prosentence 'thatt' and of the alleged prosentences `that is true' and 'it is true' and 
their modifications. But we have been through all that. Another tack that Grover takes is to present rules for the 
derivation of substitution instances from propositionally quantified statements.
17 
 For instance, we may derive 
 
(13)  John believes that snow is white 
 
From 
 
(14)  For each proposition, John believes that thatt, 
 
    or (stressing the prosentential character of 'it is true') from (14a) For each proposition, John believes that it is 
true. 
 
But this makes not a bit of difference. (13)'s grammaticality and sense together with any such rules for the 
derivation of substitution instances do not jointly entail that (14) is grammatical; nor do they jointly entail that 
(14a) is grammatical, given that 'it is true' there functions as a prosentence. 
 
All of this being the case, I conclude that we have no reason to believe, given any of the authors' arguments, that 
propositional quantification is grammatical in English. Hence we have no reason to believe that the 
prosentential theory of truth is true, even if there were no problems with it other than that of propositional 
quantification. Now it is true that I have not shown the theory to be false, but that was not my aim. What I think 
I have shown is that the authors have failed to render their theory plausible. Indeed, it poses many problems 
which remain unsolved. Hence, provisionally at least, the theory is to be rejected.
18 
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